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Abstract 
This study aimed to determine whether or not a correlation between independent 
expenditure levels and political partisanship in the US House of Representatives exists, using the 
Congressional sessions from before and after the Citizens United decision to determine if the 
decision had any effect on political partisanship. Multiple factors were tested to determine levels 
of correlation and to adjust for any potential exasperating factors. The study concluded that a 
very strong correlation exists between aggregate levels of independent expenditures and distance 
between average levels of partisanship for the parties. However, no causal relationship could be 
established from the data alone, though the causal mechanism was hypothesized for further 
research. 
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Executive Summary 
 
 The Citizens United decision fundamentally changed how political campaigns are 
financed in US politics. In the decision, a 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court held that the 2003 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s restriction of levels of independent expenditures, 
expenditures made on a candidate’s behalf by outside organizations without coordinating directly 
with the candidate, as unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Furthermore, the Court held 
that the significant increase in expenditures did not give rise to political corruption or the 
appearance thereof. The case divides opinion sharply, as some view the decision as expansive of 
free speech, while others view it as corruptive of the US political system as favors are implicitly 
granted in exchange for independent expenditures placed for or against candidates. The case has 
become a rallying cry for those who advocate for campaign finance reform and has been the 
subject of discussion for many a political pundit. This project examined whether or not the 
Citizens United decision, through its introduction of a massive flood of new independent 
expenditure sources and through its providing of a legal framework for the independent 
expenditure-only committee, also known as the super PAC, has increased the levels of political 
partisanship in the US House of Representatives.  
 The literature surrounding the subject of partisanship centers on explaining the larger 
trend of increasing partisanship, a trend that is essential to keep in mind when examining the 
trends from before and after the Citizens United decision was handed down. Some sources claim 
that the trend in partisanship is a continuation of the realignment that occurred after the Civil 
Rights Era, some claim that gerrymandering causes partisanship in the House, while others 
strongly refute the notion that gerrymandering causes any form of political partisanship. On the 
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subject of independent expenditures leading to political partisanship through an implicit and 
indirect quid-pro-quo coordination, however, no existing literature covered the topic.  
 To examine the trends and begin to establish the correlation, this study used independent 
expenditure data collected both before and after the decision gathered from FEC filings and 
displayed on OpenSecrets, a division of the Center for Responsive Politics. This study also 
employed DW-NOMINATE scores to measure partisanship levels in the US House of 
Representatives over the time examined. The independent expenditures were divided into pro-
Republican and pro-Democrat categories for each election cycle and then regressed alongside 
average partisanship for the subsequent Congressional sessions. This study also examined the 
total numer of independent expenditures per election cycle versus the distance between the 
average partisanship scores per subsequent Congressional sessions. This study found that a very 
strong correlation exists between levels of independent expenditures and levels of political 
partisanship in the years before and after decision. However, a solid, definite causal mechanism 
to this correlation could not be determined beyond a reasonable doubt. This study then examined 
potential causal mechanisms as well as alternate theories that could possibly address the trend 
found. This study then examines the implications of such a correlation and the Citizens United 
decision, more specifically the potential for the appearance of corruption in light of recent 
indictments having to do with quid-pro-quo corruption and independent expenditures.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Citizens United v. FEC [558 U.S. 310, 130 S. Ct. 876] has been one of the most 
controversial decisions handed down under the Roberts Court, and yet its practical implications 
are usually merely the topic of speculation by political pundits, bloggers, and news media 
outlets. President Barack Obama referred to the decision as "a major victory for big oil, Wall 
Street banks, health insurance companies and other powerful interests that marshal their power 
every day in Washington to drown out the voices of everyday Americans” (Kang 3). The case 
that Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell praises while Senators Bernie Sanders and John 
McCain decry clearly divides opinion on the implications of the decision on campaign finance. 
But what effects has the decision had on the US political system? More specifically, in an 
atmosphere of increasing political polarization, has Citizens United contributed to the 
phenomenon? 
I found that, in the US House of Representatives, the Citizens United decision likely did 
have an effect on average partisan distance between the two major political parties. Through a 
correlation between independent expenditure levels and average political partisanship for each 
respective party, and then through a correlation between aggregate independent expenditure 
levels and distance between average partisanship levels for the respective parties, in the years 
following the Citizens United decision, partisanship increased alongside independent expenditure 
increases. This particularly shows that the Citizens United decision is likely a factor in the 
increase in partisanship and distance between the two parties experienced in the most recent 
Congressional sessions. I first examined the exact text and implications of the decision. I then 
aggregated both independent expenditure data and partisanship level scores. I regressed the data, 
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identifying the correlation from multiple angles. I then concluded that the Citizens United 
decision is one of multiple factors that have fueled the increase in partisanship in the US House 
of Representatives in recent years.  
This question is extremely relevant to the current political sphere. Citizens United marks 
both a departure from precedent and a significant change in how campaign finance functions. 
The effects of this change, however, have not been extensively documented by academics and 
often get lost in the rhetoric and accusations made by politicians on the topic. I believe that this 
may be the case in the House of Representatives for new candidates with relatively obscure 
political position records, especially if the importance of campaign finance campaign finance 
outweighs the need to resonate with a median voter in order to undermine an incumbent 
representative. Furthermore, the sheer amounts of money independent expenditure-only 
committees have been able to raise and spend for and against candidates makes the topic a 
significant question of interest. In the 2014 election alone, independent expenditure-only 
committees raised $606,116,702 in independent expenditure funds and spent $345,632,140 of the 
funds for or against particular candidates (“Outside Spending, By Super PAC”). Even though 
these independent expenditure-only committees are not legally allowed to coordinate with 
candidates, single-candidate independent expenditure-only committees have become important 
players in the campaign finance of particular candidates. This allows corporations, unions, and 
individuals to give unlimited amounts in support of particular candidates without violating 
election law, since these particular committees are “independent” of the candidate.  
Methodology 
I first discuss the specifics of how the Citizens United decision changed the electoral 
process, what it legalized, and what has arisen in the wake of the decision, specifically the super 
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PAC. This is integral to understanding how independent expenditures work in the wake of 
Citizens United. I then examine trends in independent expenditures from the pre-decision and 
post-decision House election cycles. I then show how independent expenditures have 
significantly increased in the wake of the Citizens United decision. I then examine the trends in 
partisanship that coincide with the Citizens United decision. Using the data I have collected, I am 
able to analyze partisanship levels in relation to independent expenditure levels. I examine the 
correlation between average independent expenditure amounts and average partisanship level, 
determined by DW-NOMINATE score, on a party level. I then use average aggregate 
independent expenditure levels compared to distance between average DW-NOMINATE scores 
to compare how independent expenditures have affected the distance between the party’s average 
partisanship levels.  I then discuss the merits and limits of the alternate theories that have been 
proposed on the topics I have researched.  
I utilize online databases such as OpenSecrets, FEC disclosures, studies and publications 
by the Sunlight Foundation, and other sources to gather the data necessary for testing this 
hypothesis. I use these databases in this case to determine which candidates have received 
increasingly larger amounts of independent expenditures. I also use the database to track the 
organizations where these independent expenditures are originating from in order to determine 
the ideological intentions behind the independent expenditure. I determine ideological stance 
behind organizations based on their stated intentions, organizational platform, important issues, 
and past donation and expenditure tendencies. I use this data to display how amounts of 
independent expenditures, their sources, and their beneficiaries have changed since Citizens 
United and to contrast post-Citizens United expenditures with ones that occurred before the 
decision, when independent expenditures were significantly more limited. 
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I use databases such as GovTrack and VoteView in order to determine levels of 
partisanship and to measure how these scores have changed over time with respect to 
independent expenditures. These databases allow me to gauge how degree of ideological 
extremism over time has changed and allow me to graph the change alongside increases in 
independent expenditures. I employ the R program for the statistical analysis portion of the 
project. I use the program to produce the correlation coefficients and to aggregate and analyze 
the data that I mine out of the aforementioned resources. I also use the program to produce 
visuals and graphs to display the data in order to facilitate analysis.  
The Decision 
The decision of the Supreme Court in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 
from hereon out noted as Citizens United, profoundly affected how federal elections are and can 
be financed and provided a new source of potential electoral funds for candidates. Before 
Citizens United, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), passed in 2002, prohibited “the 
broadcast, cable or satellite transmission of ‘electioneering communications’ paid for by 
corporations or labor unions from their general funds in the 30 days before a presidential primary 
and in the 60 days before a general election” (Liptak). Citizens United, a non-profit organization 
that describes itself as seeking “to reassert the traditional American values of limited 
government, freedom of enterprise, strong families, and national sovereignty and security,” 
sought to screen a political documentary entitled Hillary: The Movie during the 2008 presidential 
election cycle within the prohibited margins set out by the BCRA (“Who Are We”, Liptak). 
While Citizens United contended that the movie was “issue speech” and therefore did “not 
expressly say how a voter should vote,” the US District Court for the District of Columbia found 
that the movie “references the election and Senator Clinton’s candidacy, and it takes a position 
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on her character, qualifications, and fitness for office (Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission, US District Court for the District of Columbia). On these grounds, the US District 
Court enforced precedent set down in both Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and 
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission and denied Citizens United the right to both 
advertise and air the film. The case was then appealed for certiorari to the Supreme Court and 
was placed on the docket for early 2009.  
The Supreme Court took a broad and expansive scope in deciding the case. In the 
decision authored by Justice Kennedy, the Court “recognized that First Amendment protection 
extends to corporations” and that “‘as a restriction on the amount of money a person or group 
can spend on political communication during a campaign,’” the BCRA “prohibition on corporate 
independent expenditures is thus a ban on speech” (Citizens United v. FEC [558 U.S. 310, 130 S. 
Ct. 876] p. 22-25). In essence, while “corporations or unions may not give money directly to 
campaigns, they may seek to persuade the voting public through other means, including 
[advertisements]” (“Case Files: Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission”). This, in 
essence, is the definition of the term independent expenditure. The decision allows corporations, 
unions, or other similar organizations to spend money from their general treasuries on political 
speech for or against candidates in unlimited amounts and without time restrictions as long as the 
organizations do not directly coordinate with the candidate they are supporting. Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court held that any “anticorruption interest is not sufficient to displace the speech here 
in question” (Citizens United v. FEC [558 U.S. 310, 130 S. Ct. 876] p. 22-25). Justice Kennedy 
established that the BCRA seeks to limit First Amendment rights in the interest of “the 
prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption” (idem. at 29). When examining cases 
involving restrictions on the First Amendment, the Supreme Court uses the “strict scrutiny” test, 
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which “requires the Government to prove that that the restriction [in question] ‘furthers a 
compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest’” (idem. at 23). The Court’s 
majority found that, in this case, the provisions of the BCRA banning “corporate independent 
expenditures” cited Buckley v. Valeo in finding that expenditure bans outside of the realm of 
direct contributions are “inadequate to justify” the restriction on First Amendment rights that the 
ban imposes (idem. at 40). In essence, the Court held that anticorruption in the “quid-pro-quo” 
sense, as Justice Stevens conceptualized, is not compelling enough of a governmental interest to 
warrant a restriction on free speech in the form of spending money (idem.). This decision 
legitimized a resource in campaign finance that, in comparison to today, was largely 
underutilized and relatively unimportant. Perhaps the most important implication of Citizens 
United was the inception of the super PAC.  
The independent expenditure-only committee, commonly known as the “super PAC,” is a 
political action committee that “may raise unlimited sums of money from corporations, unions, 
associations, and individuals” and “spend unlimited sums to overtly advocate for or against 
political candidates” (“PACs: SuperPACs”). The super PAC entity was authorized in a US Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which held in Speechnow.org v. Federal Election 
Commission that, in the wake of the Citizens United decision and the holding that the 
“government has no anti-corruption interest in limiting independent expenditures,” 
“contributions to groups that only make independent expenditures cannot corrupt or create the 
appearance of corruption.” It further held that any contribution limits on such organizations 
“violate the First Amendment by preventing [individuals] from donating to [such organizations] 
in excess of the limits and prohibiting [such organizations] from accepting donations in excess of 
the limits” (“Ongoing Litigation: Speechnow.org v. FEC). This holding by the US Court of 
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Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the legal status of the independent expenditure-
only committee, providing a new and increasingly important entity for politicians to employ 
while financing and administrating their campaigns. While the independent expenditure-only 
committee’s legal existence was affirmed in Speechnow.org v. FEC, the legal basis for its 
existence can be found within the Citizens United decision, and the Citizens United decision is 
cited throughout the case. The Supreme Court denied the FEC’s petition for a writ of certiorari 
in the Speechnow case on November 1st, 2010 and currently remains off of the Supreme Court’s 
docket (“Speechnow.org v FEC”). This can be attributed as either an affirmation of the DC 
Circuit Court’s ruling in the case or as merely a refusal to address the issue at the moment. Due 
to the denial of certiorari to the Supreme Court, the DC Circuit Court’s holding remains the 
acting precedent, and independent expenditure-only committees continue to legally operate in the 
United States. As mentioned previously, the super PAC has evolved since 2010 to include single-
candidate independent expenditure-only committees that are allowed to make unlimited 
expenditures for a particular candidate while maintaining legal independence from the particular 
candidate. 
 Though the super PAC is perhaps the most visible and significant effect of the Citizens 
United decision, the decision impacts campaign finance in other areas and expands the abilities 
of other organizations, such as unions, corporations, and nonprofit operations to independently 
expend on behalf of particular candidates, parties, or issues. Although super PACs have outspent 
both unions and corporations by about a 7:2 margin in both the 2012 and the 2014 election cycle, 
the Citizens United case specifically targeted the prohibitions in the Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act that “restricted corporations and unions from using their general treasury funds to 
make independent expenditures” (“Outside Spending,” Citizens United v. FEC [558 U.S. 310, 
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130 S. Ct. 876] p. 1). Also, some 501(c) nonprofit organizations have contributed independent 
expenditures for or against candidates even though the IRS forbids their primary involvement 
being politics.  
Literature Review 
I have examined previous scholarship on the topic of the rise of partisanship in the 
contemporary political atmosphere and on the topic of Citizens United, yet there seems to be a 
missing connection between the two topics. Jens Grosser and Thomas R. Palfrey, Professors at 
Florida State University and California Institute of Technology respectively, have produced what 
they refer to as the “antimedian voter theorem” in order to address increasing partisanship among 
political candidates. Grosser and Palfrey have found that “in large elections, only the most 
extreme citizens will compete for office,” that “the result does not depend on the distribution of 
voter preferences,” and that “political polarization is an equilibrium outcome even if the citizenry 
is informed about candidates’ political leanings.” The theory addresses the “entry games” of 
political candidates, concluding that strong partisans are the most likely to run for office (Grosser 
and Palfrey). While this theory addresses what type of person is most likely to run for office, it 
does not explain why partisanship would continuously increase nor increase sharply over the 
period since Citizens United, which, according to the DW-NOMINATE data available on 
VoteView, has been the case (“The Polarization of the Congressional Parties”).  Sanford 
Levinson, constitutional law professor at University of Texas at Austin, seems to believe that 
partisan gerrymandering contributes significantly to the recent spike in partisanship. Professor 
Levinson believes that the “most fundamental consequence of the 2010 elections may have been 
the opportunity they gave to Republican state legislatures…to redraw the political districts that 
would elect representatives to Congress.” This has made “the distribution of voters more 
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consequential than their raw number” and “render[s] general elections near-irrelevant” due to the 
fact that districts are drawn to favor particular parties (Levinson).  
 While gerrymandering is commonly pointed to as a significant factor in increasing 
partisan sentiments in the US House of Representatives, some political scientists have examined 
the issue and ruled out gerrymandering as a potential cause of partisanship. Coincidentally, the 
redrawing of congressional district lines took place in the same year that the Citizens United 
decision was handed down. Naturally, one may conclude that gerrymandering provides more 
secure seats for the incumbent party, allowing for the incumbent candidate to take on 
increasingly more partisan political stances without having to risk moderating himself or herself 
to appeal to a mixed district electorate. However, multiple scholars have already established that 
gerrymandering effects neither political polarization nor electoral competition. Indeed, McCarty 
et al. stated that “partisanship would appear to make a compelling circumstantial case for an 
increase in polarization,” as “politicians are observed engaging in raw power politics” while 
“simultaneously, electoral competitiveness declines in Congress.” However, they have found that 
the “increase in polarization is not primarily a phenomenon of how voters are sorted into 
districts” (McCarty et al.) Masket et. al, using the same DW-NOMINATE scores employed in 
my own research, compared the use of partisan redistricting commissions versus nonpartisan 
districting commissions in the wake of the 2000 census and subsequent redistricting. They 
concluded that, “partisan redistricting schemes are, if anything, associated with declining 
legislative polarization” (Masket et al.) Furthermore, as shown in the graphic below, the increase 
in political partisanship is not exclusive to the House of Representatives, but also affects the 
Senate (“The Polarization of the Congressional Parties”). If gerrymandering is the predominant 
cause of the increase in political partisanship in the US Congress, one would expect to only see 
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an increase in partisanship in the House, as the Senate cannot be gerrymandered due to its 
design. While gerrymandering’s impact of partisanship is subject to debate, the gerrymandering 
debate still ignores the potential impact that the introduction of vast quantities of independent 
expenditures into the post-Citizens United election cycles has had on the significant increase in 
partisanship across the political spectrum, but particularly in the US House of Representatives.  
 Senator Tom Udall, in a policy essay in the Yale Law and Policy Review, discussed the 
jurisprudence and the implications of the Citizens United decision on those who run and serve in 
Congress as well as a few ways that the decision could be overturned. Senator Udall asserts that 
“our elections no longer focus on the needs and interests of individual voters, but are instead 
shaped by multi-million dollar ad campaigns funded by special interest groups with seemingly 
limitless resources” (Udall 2). Senator Udall also discusses what he has referred to as the 
“endless campaign cycle,” where, due to the increase in campaign costs, “officials spend to much 
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far too much time engaged in fundraising rather than doing the work the American people elect 
them to do.” He quotes a joint op-ed published by “former US Senators Warren Rudman (R-NH) 
and Tim Wirth (D-CO),” who assert that “Congress is stuck in the mud of strident partisanship, 
excessive ideology, never-ending campaigns, and–at the heart of it all–a corrosive system of 
private campaign funding.” Furthermore, both senators assert that “if there’s one reason for 
leaving” the Senate that both candidates held in common, “it’s money” (idem. at 6). Senator 
Udall goes on to advocate that since “Congress can no longer constitutionally protect the 
integrity of the electoral process” due to decisions such as Buckley v. Valeo and Citizens United 
v. FEC, “comprehensive reform can only be passed if there is a constitutional amendment that 
provides Congress with the authority to regulate all aspects of the campaign finance system” 
(idem. at 8). The senators addressed in the essay have experience working within campaign 
finance legal structures both predating and postdating the Citizens United decision. All senators 
feel that both the need to incessantly campaign and ensure both donations and independent 
expenditures for oneself has been detrimental to the functioning of Congress. Furthermore, 
Senators Rudman and Wirth seem to believe that private campaign finance, which includes 
independent expenditures, is “at the heart of” the “strident partisanship” evident in both houses 
of Congress (idem. at 6).  However, none of the three Senators have examined the data on this 
notion of increased partisanship resulting from changes in campaign finance laws in the wake of 
Citizens United. While undoubtedly all three Senators have experienced in their work what they 
feel to be increasing partisanship and what they feel to be increased pressure to align with special 
interests, these are merely feelings. I seek to further this notion by examining the data on this 
topic and establishing the correlation between Citizens United and the increase in partisanship in 
Congress.  
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 Professor Richard Pildes, in the California Law Review, addresses the trend of increasing 
polarization and provides both short-term and long-term explanations of the trend. Pildes first 
shows how the “parties have become purer distillations of themselves” over time, explaining that 
in “1976, moderates constituted 30% of the House [of Representatives],” while in 2002, “This 
proportion had shrunk to 8%” (Pildes 277). Pildes then examines how “both parties tend to 
marginalize their more moderate factions” and the “individual personalit[ies]” of those elected to 
office, but ultimately concludes that explanations that solely implicate the personalities of those 
in office as the cause of polarization are “implausible” and that “forces larger than the 
personalities of particular political figures might well be at work” (281-287).  
Pildes explains that the Voting Rights Act of 1965 “reflected and unleashed forces that, 
building on themselves over several decades, have caused a tectonic shift in the underlying 
foundations of American politics.” This shift, according to Pildes, “is perhaps the major cause of 
the hyperpolarized partisan politics we now have” (287). He explains that the “Democratic 
Party’s complete monopoly on the South” in the years predating the Voting Rights Act was not 
the “product of routine forces of political competition,” but instead the product of “a sequence of 
purposeful actions taken at the end of Reconstruction, which included violence, intimidation, 
informal manipulation, and fraud.” These changes had the effect of “drastically reduc[ing] 
African American electoral participation” and “destroying the foundation for any politically 
effective challenge to the Party’s domination” (Pildes 288).  This changed the dynamic of both 
political parties. The “Democratic Party was a coalition of Southern Democrats [who were] 
extremely conservative on race” and “moderate to liberal Democrats from other parts of the 
country.” The Republican Party, on the other hand, consisted of “its own divided coalition of 
liberals and moderates, mostly from the Northeast and West Coast, and much more traditional, 
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old-line conservatives from the Midwest and other rural areas.” Since “none of these groups 
were large enough to pass legislation on their own…any significant legislation required 
compromise and bargaining across party lines” (idem. at 289).  
According to Pildes, the Voting Rights Act “initiated the rise of a genuine political 
system in the South,” which in turn “reshaped the essential structure of the national political 
parties.” Since the Voting Rights Act and the Supreme Court opinions stemming from it ruled 
“literacy tests, poll taxes, manipulative registration practices, and durational residency 
requirements” unconstitutional, “a massive infusion of new voters,” who were on average “much 
more liberal than the median voting white Southerner had been before 1965,” inundated the 
Southern electorate, causing an electoral shift. Conservatives found themselves more aligned 
with the Republican Party, which became “highly conservative” while a “new, moderate-to-
liberal Democratic Party that was more in line with the rest of the Democratic Party” was left in 
the wake. Due to a “self-reinforcing feedback dynamic,” the Democratic Party “became more 
liberal in the South, conservatives fled,” and the Democratic Party became increasingly more 
liberal while the “progressive strands on racial issues that had existed in the Republican Party 
diminished” (idem. at 290). The full effect of this shift “took about thirty years to come to 
fruitation,” but set off a process of “party purification” that the United States is “probably still in 
the midst of” today (idem. at 293-294). Pildes’ analysis of the Voting Rights Act provides an 
excellent explanation of the long-term trend of increasing polarization in American politics since 
the enactment of the Voting Rights Act. However, while Pildes explains a larger driving force of 
the trend, he does not consider that the “party purification” he speaks of has increased 
exponentially rather than at a steady rate, as shown in the table below. Furthermore, in the period 
between the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to the Reagan Presidency in 1980, the 
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period in which this supposed party purification began to polarize the parties, partisanship 
significantly decreased for significant amounts of time, with sharp upticks in some areas. Finally, 
Pildes does not address the looming issue of whether or not independent expenditures, which 
have significantly increased in amounts alongside the recent increase in polarization, contribute 
to or exacerbate this trend. While Pildes’ argument that the Voting Rights Act influenced the 
long-term increase in partisanship, he does not address the independent expenditure issue in 
relation to the short-term increase in polarization we are experiencing today.  
 Data Disclaimer 
 Due to the nature of FEC filing and reporting requirements, the data available for each 
candidate contains a margin of error. For example, considering items such as electioneering 
communications, “several candidates can be listed on a report with no indication of how the 
money should be distributed among the candidates, or even if the money is being spent for or 
against candidates” (“Why Don’t These Numbers Add Up?”). 1 However, electioneering 
communications constitute a rather small amount in proportion to the entirety of independent 
expenditures. For example, in the 2012 election cycle, electioneering communications 
constituted $15.4 million of the $1.37 billion spent in total independent expenditures (“Outside 
Spending”). Clearly a margin of error exists within the data, and that standard error is displayed 
on the graphs exhibited in the analysis portion below. 
 Furthermore, the data used in this project is the most recent data available through FEC 
filings. However, through my experience with this data, as new FEC reports are filed, older 
1 According to the FEC, “an electioneering communication is any broadcast, cable or satellite 
communication that fulfills each of the following conditions: 1) The communication refers to a 
clearly identified candidate for federal office; 2) the communication is publicly distributed 
shortly before an election for the office that the candidate is seeking; and 3) the communication 
is targeted to the relevant electorate (US House and Senate candidates only)” (Electioneering 
Communications”). 
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reports are uncovered, and different organizations are required to disclose, the data on particular 
election years is subject to change. During the course of the research for this project, the 
independent expenditure totals reported by OpenSecrets increased from the $998 million mark to 
above $1 billion (idem.). OpenSecrets updates its data as it receives the reports from the FEC. 
Though the data contained on the OpenSecrets website is somewhat subject to change, it is the 
most accurate data available on independent expenditures available.  
 The data provided through the OpenSecrets and available in FEC filings only includes 
any candidate with over $1000 in outside spending (“2014 Outside Spending, By Candidate,” see 
bottom of page). This is not ideal, as I would like to get as comprehensive of a picture of the 
actual amount of independent expenditures being made as possible. However, even when 
multiple candidates have received less than $1000 in independent expenditures, the aggregate 
effect of including these expenditures if the data was available would likely be negligible on the 
outcome.  
Analysis 
 Using OpenSecrets as my data reference, I crossed the aggregate independent expenditure 
levels of the pre-Citizens United election cycles with the post-Citizens United election cycles, 
one of which is currently ongoing. I have found that, in the wake of the Citizens United decision, 
independent expenditures have increased from $143.6 million in 2008 to $205.5 million in 2010, 
over $1billion in 2012, and $572.9 million in the ongoing 2014 election thus far (“Outside 
Spending”). This shows a significant increase in the overall levels of independent expenditures in 
federal elections, and the  decrease in the 2014 column from the 2012 column can be explained 
by recognizing that the election cycle is both not over and is not a year where a presidential 
election occurs. 
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Examining exclusively the US House of Representatives, independent expenditure 
amounts from 2004-2014 follow a different trend from the overall rising amounts of independent 
expenditures in elections. As shown in the graph below, total independent expenditures in US 
House of Representative elections rose from 2004 election cycle to the 2006 election cycle and 
then dropped from 2006 election cycle to the 2008 election cycle. Considering that the 2010 
election cycle was the first election cycle to apply the Citizens United decision to campaign 
finance, one might anticipate a significant increase in independent expenditures, as is reflected in 
the graph. In the immediate wake of the Citizens United decision, independent expenditures in 
US House of Representative elections rose from $66,553536 in the 2008 election cycle to 
$253,918,012 in the 2010 election cycle and peaked at this number. It is also important to note 
that 2010 was not a presidential election year. The trend of increased independent expenditures 
in US House of Representative races in non-presidential election years is reflective of previous 
occurrences, as displayed in the chart. This trend is further reflected in the next election cycle, as 
from the 2010 election cycle to the 2012 election cycle, independent expenditures in House races 
decreased from $250,918,012 in the 2010 cycle to $173,668,799 in the 2012 cycle. However, 
interestingly, the trend of total independent expenditures continued downward in the next 
election cycle, dropping from $173,668,799 in the 2012 cycle to $152,655,009 in the 2014 cycle 
(OpenSecrets, Center for Responsive Politics). While this amount is certainly significantly more 
than the amount of independent expenditures being spent before the Citizens United decision, the 
data counters the popular notion that, at least in the case of the House of Representatives, more 
and more independent expenditures are being made on behalf of candidates. The expenditures 
seem to have peaked in the election cycle following the decision and have significantly 
decreased in the subsequent two election cycles.  
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Breaking down the total independent expenditures into pro-Democrat and pro GOP 
sections, a further interesting insight is made into independent expenditures made on behalf of 
House candidates. The pro-democrat section of the graph below is comprised of both 
expenditures identified by the Center for Responsive Politics and the expenditure’s FEC filings 
as pro-democrat or against-GOP expenditures, while the pro-GOP section is comprised of 
expenditures identified as either pro-GOP or against-Democrats (“Outside Spending, By 
Candidate”). When broken down, the data trend reveals, interestingly, that in the 2010 election 
cycle in the wake of Citizens United, contrary to popular belief, more independent expenditures 
were made on behalf of Democrats than were made on behalf of Republicans, with Democrats 
receiving the highest amount in the data range. In the subsequent 2012-election cycle, however, 
Republicans outspent Democrats by almost $35 million, with Democrats receiving significantly 
less independent expenditures and Republicans receiving the most of the data range. In the 2014 
election cycle, the Democrats received slightly more than in the 2014 election cycle, while the 
Republicans received significantly less, with both parties receiving within $11 million of each 
other, the closest amount since the pre-Citizens United era.  
 Furthermore, according to the DW-NOMINATE dimensions exhibited on VoteView, the 
distance between the parties’ first dimension, while part of a steady trend of increasing distance, 
has risen quite sharply in the years since Citizens United was decided (“The Polarization of the 
Congressional Parties”). The two graphs below display the breakdown in average partisanship, 
based on DW-NOMINATE scores, of the Democratic and Republican parties from the 108th 
Congress to the 113th Congress. A chart associating the Congressional session with the election 
cycle year is provided above. While partisanship is increasing across both of the parties, as 
 
18 
 
displayed previously, breaking down the two parties reveals some interesting trends about the 
dynamics of partisanship in the US House of Representatives.  
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The trend in GOP partisanship seems to be steadily increasing over the period of time examined.  
While the average GOP DW-NOMINATE score is further from the center than the average 
Democratic DW-NOMINATE score, the data trend does not exhibit any spikes or significant 
outliers over the period of time examined. Outwardly, it does not exhibit any interesting 
phenomenon that allows for inferences to be drawn from it.  
 
20 
 
 
 Significantly more interesting, however, is the trend exhibited within the Democratic 
Party with respect to partisanship. The average Democratic score begins and ends at lower levels 
than the average Republican score. However, the average Democratic Party score does not 
follow the same steady, uninterrupted trend that the Republican Party’s data set exhibits. At first, 
the Democratic Party’s trend begins to modestly rise between the 108th and 109th Congressional 
sessions. Between the 109th and 111th sessions, however, the average DW-NOMINATE 
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partisanship rating drops drastically, from -0.382 to -0.349. However, following the 2010 
election cycle in the 112th Congress, the Democratic Party’s average partisanship score spiked 
drastically, from -0.349 to an all-time high of -0.394. The average score then began a downward 
slope, with the 113th Congress ultimately earning a score of -0.372. The Democratic Party’s 
average DW-NOMINATE partisanship score does not follow the same gradual trend that the 
GOP’s score does. Instead, the score spikes at a significant point in the data range.   
 The correlation coefficients of the data examined reveal that, over the years examined, a 
correlation of varying strength exists between amount spent in independent expenditures on 
campaigns and level of partisanship the US House of Representatives. The data is displayed on 
the tables below. The correlation coefficient is defined as a number between 1 and -1, where 1 
indicates a perfect positive correlation between the two values, 0 indicates no correlation, and -1 
indicates a perfect negative correlation between the values. A weak correlation is defined as the 
correlation coefficient being in the range of 0.1-0.3, with a medium strength correlation defined 
as being in the range of 0.3-0.5 and a strong correlation being in the range of 0.5-1.0 (“Pearson 
Product-Moment Correlation”). However, since the DW-NOMINATE score for Democrats is a 
negative number, the more negative the correlation coefficient for Democrats, the stronger the 
correlation. Examining the correlation coefficients after regressing aggregate pro-party spending 
compared to average DW-NOMINATE score, I find that there is a strong correlation between 
aggregate pro-party spending and partisanship, as denoted by DW-NOMINATE score. This 
trend is displayed on the graphs on pages 24-27.  
Examining the correlation in current dollars, I find that the correlation coefficient for 
aggregate pro-GOP independent expenditures per election cycle versus average GOP DW-
NOMINATE score is 0.8670694, indicating a “very strong” correlation between the two 
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variables. Likewise, when examining the same variables but substituting pro-Democrat 
expenditures, the resulting correlation coefficient is -0.6048525, indicating a “strong” correlation 
between the two variables. The graphs of these relationships can be found on pages 25-28. 
Examining the correlation coefficients in constant dollars, I find that though controlling for 
inflation has a nominal mitigating effect on the correlation between independent expenditures 
and partisanship in the House, the “strong” correlation between the two variables still exists. 
Under the same variable definitions as used above, but using constant dollars for the independent 
expenditure levels, I found that the correlation coefficient for pro-GOP independent expenditures 
in constant dollars versus average DW-NOMINATE score is 0.8264963, indicating that a “very 
strong” correlation between the two variables still exists when controlling for inflation. Likewise, 
when controlling for inflation, the correlation coefficient for the Democratic party is -0.6192044, 
suggesting still that a strong correlation exists between average pro-Democrat independent 
expenditures in House races and average partisanship in Congress. The graphs of these 
relationships can be found on pages 29-32. Furthermore, the data for both parties remain within 
the standard error for both statistical analyses, so no significant outliers are present. In order to 
better analyze and visualize the data, I have included the graphs on the next two pages, which 
display the trends above. 
Perhaps the most significant relationship to analyze is the relationship between average 
level of overall independent expenditure and average distance between DW-NOMINATE scores. 
The average distance between the scores shows us how far apart the parties are from each other 
at any given time. The graph of this relationship is displayed on p ages 33-34. The pre-Citizens 
United election cycles (2004, 2006, and 2010) are all located towards the bottom of the graph 
with little variance in average DW-NOMINATE distance when manipulating independent 
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expenditure levels. However, the two election cycles (2010, 2012) that occurred after the 
decision experienced both a significant increase in total expenditures and a significant increase in 
distance between average DW-NOMINATE score. This suggests that there is a correlation 
between total independent expenditure levels and average DW-NOMINATE score distance, 
indicating that independent expenditure amounts are correlated with increased partisanship in the 
US House of Representatives. Indeed, upon analysis of the data, the correlation coefficient for 
the respective variables is 0.8335487, indicating that there is a very strong correlation between 
total independent expenditure levels in an election cycle and the distance between party average 
DW-NOMINATE scores in the subsequent House session. This relationship is perhaps the most 
interesting. The above graph clearly shows the significant difference in the pre-Citizens United 
era and the post-Citizens United era in terms of independent expenditures and political 
partisanship. As more and more independent expenditures are made, the parties seem to be 
moving further and further apart on political issues. This seems to be particularly true for the 
House sessions immediately before and immediately after the Citizens United, as the most 
significant increase in both independent expenditure levels and distance between average party 
DW- NOMINATE score occurred in this span of time. This shows that the handing down of the 
Citizens United decision is in fact correlated with the increase in partisanship levels in the US 
House of Representatives. 
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I posit that the Citizens United decision allowed significantly more independent 
expenditure money into the campaign finance system while simultaneously creating aggregating 
organizations in the form of super PACs. These super PACs tend to have significantly more 
partisan views than the electorate or the average politician, and those super PACs who tend to 
elicit the most donations tend to be the most partisan. The introduction of a new influx of 
independent expenditures and the rise of the super PAC means that those in Congress who 
appeal to the most powerful super PACs have an advantage in elections, as they will have more 
independent expenditures in their favor than their opponents who do not win the favor of the 
more powerful super PACs. Due to this need to win the favor of the most powerful super PACs, 
Congressional candidates must adjust their viewpoints to be more in line with the more powerful 
super PACs, which in turn causes a partisan shift in the Congressional electorate. This is further 
solidified by the looming threat that, if those in Congress solicit the assistance of particular super 
PACs during their election and do not espouse that particular super PAC’s platform while in 
Congress, the solicited super PACs will then fund said member of Congress’s opponent in the 
next primary. This makes each member of Congress beholden to the interests of the super PACs, 
and therefore increases partisanship across the board. While this may be a plausible causal 
mechanism, however, it may be incorrect or flawed.  
While this correlation is very strong, and the causal mechanism I posit could possibly be 
true, it does not necessarily indicate that the Citizens United decision caused the increase of 
partisanship during this period, though it quite possibly could have contributed to it. 
Unfortunately, without direct evidence indicating causation, which is extremely difficult to 
manifest, it is impossible to conclude beyond a doubt that the Citizens United decision caused the 
increase in political partisanship during the period studied, particularly when this increase in 
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partisanship is also part of a longer trend of ever-increasing partisanship as previously described. 
However, this is still an interesting correlation to examine. Further research could give more 
insight into how the Citizens United decision has affected individual candidates. This could 
consist of case studies of individual members of Congress tracking their independent expenditure 
intakes, partisanship levels, and viewpoints on particular issues with respect to the viewpoints of 
those individuals or organizations that make independent expenditures on behalf of the member 
of Congress. This would allow insight into how particular members of Congress are affected by 
independent expenditures while controlling for other variables. A longer-term study into the 
effects of the Citizens United decision would also benefit the development of this thesis. The 
decision has only been in effect for five years at the time of this study, and the data pool is 
significantly restricted due to this fact. If Citizens United remains precedent for a significant 
period of time following this project, a longer-term study of its effects would assist in 
understanding the decision’s effect on political partisanship and determining if this increase is a 
significant anomaly or just part of the greater overall trend of increasing partisanship.  
Alternate Theories 
The change in levels of partisanship in the US House of Representatives since the 
Citizens United decision is probably not exclusively caused by the decision, and the correlation 
between independent expenditure levels and partisanship in the US House of Representatives 
could be explained by some other factors. In the literature review, I referenced Professor Richard 
Pildes’ theory of increasing partisanship as a trend caused by the realignment of the two main 
political parties during and after the Civil Rights Era. Certainly after examining the overall trend 
of partisanship levels in the US, the current trend began its climb in the early-to-mid 1970s in the 
wake of the realignment. Pildes provides a fair argument and perhaps there is some merit to his 
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explanation of the trend, but while his explanation can explain the beginnings, he ignores a 
multitude of other factors that, in the years since the political realignment, could have influenced 
and furthered the trend of exponentially increasing political partisanship.  
Implications 
 The correlation between independent expenditure levels and political partisanship 
in the US House of Representatives reflect the real implications of the Citizens United decision 
on the legislative process in the United States and on the democratic process as a whole. Through 
unlimited independent expenditures and the introduction of the super PAC, groups and 
individuals with specific special interests are able to directly or indirectly influence how 
politicians vote on particular issues. Particularly in the House of Representatives, interest groups 
are able to easily sway how politicians vote on particular issues, for the money that they expend 
on the behalf or in opposition to particular candidates has the potential to decide both primaries 
and general elections for or against candidates. Furthermore, former representatives such as 
former Congressman Michael Arcuri have openly stated that they feel inclined to vote in line 
with those who expend on behalf of their campaigns, for, as Arcuri put it, “those who have the 
money need the favors done” (Arcuri). Though the Supreme Court declares that such 
expenditures do not cause “corruption or the appearance of corruption” in a quid- 
pro-quo sense, the notion that those with significant amounts of money to expend on behalf of 
particular candidates can create at least the appearance of some form of corruption. The effect 
that the increase of independent expenditures in the post-Citizens United era has had on political 
partisanship in the US House of Representatives gives credence to this notion. If independent 
expenditures can incline elected officials to hold increasingly more extreme views, seek less 
compromise, and align themselves more with those who possess the means to make independent 
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expenditures rather than all of those whom they represent, how can Congress still call itself a 
democratic legislature?  
 Indeed, many still view the lifting of limits on independent expenditures as potentially 
corrupting members of Congress. Recently, the United States Department of Justice indicted 
Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ) on corruption charges. The charges stem from Senator 
Menendez’s relationship with a Florida ophthalmologist who donated $600,000 to a Democratic 
super PAC from his business, earmarking it to “be spent in New Jersey helping on the senator’s 
re-election.” In exchange, Menendez allegedly “intervene[d] in a Medicare billing dispute worth 
almost $9 million” to his donor, among other alleged favors (Confessore and Apuzzo). Under the 
Citizens United decision, it would seem that neither Menendez’s donor nor Menendez did 
anything illegal. However, the situation manifestly appears corrupt. This situation is a perfect 
example of how the residual effects of Citizens United can influence Congress. On one hand, the 
effects have the ability to further divide Congress, pushing candidates further to the extremes. On 
the other hand, they can clearly create the appearance of corruption in the Congressional election 
system in both chambers of Congress.  
 The Supreme Court has created a significant problem in the wake of its Citizens United 
decision. Justice Kennedy may have been correct when he stated that unlimited independent 
expenditures “did not give rise to corruption.” However, he may have been incorrect in asserting 
that lifting the limits and restrictions on independent expenditures, equating money with speech, 
and enfranchising corporations with First Amendment free speech rights did not give rise to the 
“appearance of corruption” (Citizens United v. FEC [558 U.S. 310, 130 S. Ct. 876]). Citizens 
United significantly affected how the House of Representatives operated by contributing to the 
significant increase in partisanship following its deciding. Many, myself included, have viewed 
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this decision as influencing Congress to the point where Congress does appear to be corrupted 
and swayed by the amount of independent expenditure money spent in election cycles. While 
lifting the limits and restrictions on independent expenditures may only give rise to the 
“appearance of corruption,” the Supreme Court recognizes that avoiding the appearance of 
corruption is a compelling enough reason to impose restrictions on free speech (idem.). I have 
shown through my research that the lifting of independent expenditure limits and restrictions can 
have a powerful effect on the partisan tendencies of those who depend on maximizing financing 
to keep their jobs. Clearly, the Citizens United decision can have other residual effects that, 
though unintentional, serve to undermine the faith people have in the democratic electoral system 
that the US maintains. Though the Supreme Court may have never intended the Citizens United 
decision to give rise to this, the fact of the matter is that many US citizens now view the 
aftereffects of the decision as corruptive of the US political system. Perhaps the Court needs to 
revisit this issue in the near future, and sooner rather than later. 
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